

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Partial Soviet Standard Brief No 71

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/02/28 : CIA-RDP82-00046R000500230004-7 SECRET -3-Partial Soviet Standard Brief No 71. 50X1 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY Komendatura Information • Unit Designations 50X1 Source had never seen or heard of a unit designation marked on any equipment and said that only the FFH was used on documents and personal mail.2. 3. <u>Unit Security Duties</u> The only unit security duties Source was able to recall, ever and above normal interior guard, were as follows: 50X1 a. Informing Iconomol members of the unit were believed acures of informers within the unit. These men, to be the main directly to the unit political efficers with any information they might 50X1 have on their comrades. 50X1 b. Alert, Stand-By Platoon each platoon took its turn as the Company Alert Platoon for a period of 24 hours. During this period the personnel of the platoon were required to remain immediately available to fulfill any emergency task required of them. c. AWOL Patrols During Sundays and holidays Source's battalion sent patrols into the neighboring towns to look for personnel who might be there illegally.

During these periods, the interior guard was also increased by placing
personnel on "secret posts" to apprehend any one going or coming from town
without permission. In this connection, Source stated that in his experience personnel in Soviet uniform were not stopped for identification by sentries in his last unit as well as in many other units he visited, except when an officer was nearby. In these cases when an officer was near, the service book was asked for, but this identification was considered sufficient. Officers in uniform did not need to present any identification. ٥ SECRET

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never had any difficulty in entering other unit military areas when wished. Only if an officer was near would the sentry, if he did not know the individual, ask where he was going and then report this information to the officer. The officer would then take the initiative, depending upon the request. Source claimed that he often visited other units to attend movies and had never been stopped or questioned. Source had no further information on unit security duties.

4. Censorship

Source stated that officially there was no censorship of mail of the Soviet forces in Austria. He believed, however, that mail was censored but was unable to provide any reasons for this belief. Instructions as to what not to write home about were never seen by him in published form or told to him. He stated that it was just understood that anything military was not to be described in private correspondence. He had never heard of any one either writing to or receiving letters from Austrians or any other non-Soviet correspondents.

5. Policy on Photography

Cameras were permitted to the personnel of Source's battalion. Photography of military equipment and installations, however, was forbidden by general understanding. Photographs also had to be developed in the battalion darkroom. It was not possible, in Source's belief, for a Soviet Army soldier to get pictures developed by a civilian photo laboratory. Source himself was not interested in photography and possessed no camera; therefore, he was unable to provide factual information on this subject. He was unable to provide any information as to punishment violators of these rules would get. He knew of no cases where any one had violated these rules.

6. Security Policies on Foreign Nationals

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Source stated that the only Austrian nationals that he had ever seen in his battalion garrison were approximately five men who were occasionally called to do repair work. They were painters, carpenters, and plumbers. Source only knew the name of one of them Franz ADICK or ADIK, a painter living in BLUMAU (4755N-1618E).

both ADICK and his brother spoke a little Russian. 50X1

These Austrians who came on the post to work required no special written pass or identification except a verbal approval to enter by the duty officer. There were no other foreign nationals, to the best of Source's knowledge, who ever came into the garrison.

7. Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence

a. Alleged Counterintelligence Headquarters for CGF Austria.

The only personnel whom Source thought he knew of in Austria who wore civilian clothes to conceal their identity were the Special Section counterintelligence officers and sergeants. Although Source did not know any such personnel by name, he believed that any area occupied by a Soviet unit had a 50X1 least one counterintelligence man assigned to it.

about one kilometer away from their garrison, in a civilian house. This 50X1 house was pointed out that this was the Counterintelligence Headquarters for CGF. Source had personally seen both male and female personnel who, he stated, belonged to

this unit, entering and leaving the establishment either in uniform or in civilian clothes. Only male personnel were seen in uniform and these wore either Air Force or Armored officers' uniforms. Although Source had never seen any enlisted personnel of this unit, he was told by soldiers of his company that the counterintelligence unit was comprised

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headquarters. These were confiscated a models made in Germany. He had heard to often to prevent compromise. The cars plates. Source had no further informat	ustrian cars wh hat the unit ch were equipped w	anged automobiles ith Austrian license	
b. Personnel		•	50X1
(nu) who was the counterintelligence me thought that this individual was not as but was merely charged with the counter This senior lieutenant often came the company Zampolit.	n for signed to the leintelligence su	battalion. Source 35th Air Warning Bn pervision of the unifor conferences with	50X1 t. 50X1
8. Secret Documents			50X1
room in battalion headquarters that was enlisted personnel.	d a safe for do forbidden to e	cuments in a special ntrance by other ge-scale man of Aust	rie
on the wall which showed the location oposts. any of the	f all the batta post locations,	lion's air warning	5 0X1
Secret documents were picked up and Jeep from CGF Hq. The crew of this veh one driver, and privates armed with SMG no particular schedule but simply delive necessary.	icle was one un	this webiele b	6A
9. Arrests and Arrest Procedures		5	0X1

a. For Privates

The CO of a separate battalion or regiment was considered a unit (chast) commander. Therefore, he could arrest a private and confine him to the unit guard house for a period of 15-day serious arrest and 20-day simple arrest, according to the disciplinary manual.

The CO of a battalion which was not classed as a separate battalion and was therefore a sub-unit (podrazdeleniye) was able to arrest and confine a private to the unit guard house for minor violations. Confinement was not to exceed seven days.

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A company CO might arrest a private for minor violations and confine him to the unit guard house for a period not to exceed four days. For the same type of violation, a platoon CO would arrest a private and confine him to the unit guard house for a period not to exceed three days.

Within a company, the only NCO empowered to arrest a private was the company first sergeant, who could impose confinement up to four days in length in the parent battalion guard house. He meted out these punishments for minor breaches of discipline and conduct such as drinking, hooliganism, and minor cases of disrespect for authority (not including disobedience of orders).

In addition, a private could be arrested by any Soviet Komendatura patrol. The maximum period of time that a Komendatura could hold an arrested private was 20 days. After this time the private's company CO was required to come and get him personally. The unit CO also had to be notified of the arrest within 24 hours. However, the authorities at the Kommandatura could pass additional sentences on a private prisoner for misbehavior in the stockade and thus prolong his imprisonment indefinitely.

All of the above punishments could be given to a private without trial. Such confinements were by verbal order and announcements of them were made to the unit at an evening roll-call formation. Each first sergeant maintained for his company a card file called "Cards of Punishment and Award". A card was maintained for each individual in the company; one side was used to list company punishment and the other side was used to list commendations. Often arrests were not entered on these cards in an attempt by units to improve their disciplinary record, since these cards were inspected on a semi-annual basis by inspectors from a higher headquarters.

Source believed that there was a statute of limitations on such confinement.

personnel who were arrested and not confined within one month also received a notation on their records that the appropriate number of days had been served in the unit guard house.

Source also stated that company officers had occasionally remarked that with the exception of the Komendatura, only the officers in a private's chain of command might arrest him. All other officers had to notify the private's unit CO before being authorized to make the arrest. Otherwise, they had to order the private to report to his unit CO and to inform the latter of the crime.

The only persons who had the right to decide whether or not a private was to be tried by court-martial were the CO's of a separate battalion or regiment or Komendatura officers. The latter might try a soldier by court-martial without consultation with the battalion or regimental CO. In this case, the battalion or regimental CO might request either leniency or a stiffer sentence, but only after the trial had taken place.

b. For NCO s

A separate battalion or regimental CO might arrest a sergeant and confine him under strict arrest for a period not exceeding 10 days or under simple arrest for a period not exceeding 15 days. Strict (serioznyy) arrest consisted of solitary confinement with a full ration of food every other day. Simple (prostoy) arrest was with a normal food ration and with discretionary permission for the prisoner to leave the unit guard house to perform various details.

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A Komendatura might arrest an NCO and confine him for a period not exceeding 15 days. This sentence might be increased for misbehavior while in confinement or at the request of the offender's unit CO.

The decision as to whether or not a NCO would be court-martialed rested in the hands of the separate battalion or regimental CO or with the Komendatura CO if the NCO was arrested by the latter organization. In the latter case the NCO's unit CO also had the privilege or requesting leniency or a harsher method of dealing with the individual.

e. For Officers

Platoon officers might be arrested by the company CO's and confined for a period not to exceed two or three days, for minor violations of orders. This constituted the simple arrest form. A company CO or subordinate company staff officer might be arrested by the battalion CO and confined in the battalion guard house for an unknown number of days. However, Source knew of no such instances.

A company officer might be arrested by the Komendatura and placed in simple arrest in the Komendatura guard house for an unknown number of days. Source recalled that sometime in 1954 a Sr Lt (fnu) KORNENKO, the Telephone Platoon CO in the Signal Company, 135th Air Warning Bn, was arrested by the Komendatura for breaking and entering into the quarters of the female civilian employees of the CGF Hq in an unknown location in BADEN. This officer was confined by the BADEN Komendatura in simple arrest for a period of 12 days.

Source believed that a "Reward and Punishment" card file was also maintained on officers, probably in the Battalion Headquarters, on which such arrests and confinement were recorded.

Source had never heard of an "officer's honor court". He believed that an officer might be tried by courts-martial only upon the authority of a unit CO or a general officer. In case of an officer, he did not believe that the Komendatura had any authority to try by courts-martial.

d. Prisons for Military Offenders

All personnel, officers and enlisted, found guilty in court-martials were confined in unknown institutions in the USSR. Source believed one such institution was an unidentified Disciplinary Battalion located in L'VOV.1. He had no further information on such institutions.

e. Arrest Powers of Counterintelligence Personnel

In addition to the foregoing, Special Section Officers (counterintelligence) might arrest any serviceman violator, in Source's opinion, after presenting their identification. They would turn such violators over to the District Komendatura where an appropriate disposition would be made by the CO of the Komendatura. Such officers might perform arrests whether in uniform or in civilian clothing. Source was unable to define the power of the MVD counterintelligence personnel or MVD troops in relation to personnel of other Soviet military services within the geographical confines of the USSR. He believed, however, that disciplinary actions were not within the scope of the MVD in the USSR.

However, Source stated that the question of whether the MVD had powers of arrest over Soviet Army personnel in Austria were meaningless, since there were no MVD units in Austria. He had no further information on arrest powers of counterintelligence personnel or on MVD activities in general.

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Comment 1:	for Source's information on the morale, fraternization and propaganda aspects of this Soviet Standard Brief. This report and the one referred to present all information known to Source on topics covered by this Brief.
Comment 2	The manner in which Source learned of the design 50X1 nations of other units known to him was reported 50X1
Comment 3:	In this section, Source had in mind the Russian word "Chast" which in the specific sense here means a separate battalion or a regiment.
Comment 4:	However, Source admitted that he thought that the counterintelligence officers mentioned in the paragraph just above this one were MVD personnel